To Article IX (1993a: "Ethnogenesis")

This study focuses on the role of the Duguwa or Zaghāwa and the Sefuwa in the history of Kanem-Bornu. Realizing that these two ruling groups can neither be defined as different dynasties nor as different people, it suggests that they were two clans closely associated in the exercise of power. Most important for the assessment of the role of the Duguwa in the Chadic state is the reappearance of the Zaghāwa/Zaghāy name in an external source from the first half of the fifteenth century (1979b: 207 § 32). In terms of internal developments, this strange reoccurrence of a quasi-ethnic label corresponds to the rise to power of the Bulala in Kanem and the temporary leading role assumed by Duguwa officials in Bornu (1993a: 272; 1993b: 52n). While in Kanem an exclusive Duguwa rule had been established by the Bulala, the situation in Bornu was characterized by conflicts within the Sefuwa dynasty and a royal court dominated by conciliatory non-royal Duguwa officials.[26] Furthermore, the existence of numerous non-royal Duguwa in Kanem and further east seems to have given rise to the present ethnic connotation of the term Zaghāwa (1977a: 153 n. 50). The distinction between royal and non-royal Duguwa can be based on the example of the Ifẹ court where the Mọdewa – divided into three factions – are in a middle position between the non-royal clans of the Oduduwa section of the population and the Oduduwa-inclined king. In the Chadic state, the royal Karde slaves, who were in the nineteenth century under the command of the Digma, might have corresponded to the Mọdewa, while the Duguwa clans not associated with power can be compared to the Oduduwa section of the society.[27]

Going one step further, we may now accept that the first Muslim ruler of Kanem was a woman, as suggested by the *Girgam* (1977a: 67-68; 1993a: 265). Indeed, Ḥawwāʾ *bint* Arkū (1061-1065), belonging to the Duguwa royal estab-

lishment, might have been vested with an important women's office such as the Magira in Bornu, and she might have been nominally Muslim.[28] In this respect we should note that the authors of the *Girgam* depict the mother of the second successor of Ḥumē, no doubt on account of her position as Magira, as a powerful woman who, in accordance to Islamic law, emprisoned her own son for having too severely punished a thief (1977a: § 14). The nominal adherence of the second most important official of the Duguwa royal establishment to Islam could have been decisive for her temporary leading role in the state. A few years later the elimination of the royal Duguwa from power would in turn appear to have been the consequence of a general incompatibility between Islam and the continued reliance of the Duguwa on the basic practices and ceremonies of divine kingship. As former worshippers of netherworld deities and as staunch defenders of divine kingship they, like the Aznā of Hausaland, were less favourably disposed towards Islam than the worshippers of upperworld deities (see above pp. 246-248).

The single most important event giving rise to the emergence of the radical Duguwa faction of the Bulala in Kanem, was the destruction of the *munē* by Dūnama Dibalemi (c. 1203-1242). This event should not solely be conceived as a mortal blow against divine kingship, but also as an attempt to deprive the Duguwa of their remaining influence at the royal court. As long as the *munē* cult was practiced, even as a traditional ceremony, the Duguwa were assured of their continued participation in the state cult and of their association with royal administration. Its destruction heralded for them not only the end of their former world view, but also the decisive undermining of their social identity. Although the Duguwa rebellion prevented a restructuring of the palace organization, as we can see from the survival of the Duguwa in the Bornu court, it was the *munē* incident – and not the formal adoption of Islam by the court or the rise of the Sefuwa – which precipitated the most formidable crisis for the Chadic state. It not only led to the loss of Kanem but also to the temporary resurgence of the Duguwa in Bornu.

A last point to be clarified concerns the origin of the *munē* cult. Following the Sudanic state theory, the article supposes an Egyptian influence via Meroe and consequently adopts the name Amun. In fact, few culture traits in West African kingdoms point to Egyptian antecedents (1993b: 70-73; 2003: 3-6).[29] The existence of similar highly venerated cult objects have been noted for Kano and Songhay (2004d). The people of Kano used to sacrifice a great number of cattle to the *dirki* associated with the Koran. The neglect of the cult is supposed

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[28] De Moraes Farias points out the high position of the "queen" (*malika*) in the contemporary Gao state (*Inscriptions*, §§ 415-421).

[29] Oliver/Fage, *Short History*, 31-38.

to have caused famine, and the destruction of the sacred object is considered to have brought about the conquest by the Fulani Jihadists at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[30] Until the end of the Askiya dynasty, the royal emblems of Songhay included an object called *din tūr* which was transmitted from one ruler to the next.[31] In line with other elements suggesting important Hebrew-Phoenician influences on early state building processes in the Sahelian belt, it is tempting to consider the three sacred objects in connection with the Israelite tradition. The term *din tūr* might derive from the North West Semitic *dîn* "law, tribunal" and the Hebrew *tôrā* "instruction, Pentateuch".[32] The term *dirki* is perhaps related to the Ugaritic and Hebrew *drk* "power, throne of power".[33] *Munē* could refer to the biblical *manna* insofar as part of this miraculous food was kept in the ark of the covenant and a jar of it was placed in the Sanctuary.[34] Each of the three terms may therefore have been a popular name for the holiest object of a state based on the principles of divine kingships. It was considered as a safeguard for abundance and a guarantee for justice and legal government.